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The eager study of early institutions, which is a marked
characteristic of the lasf two or three decades, has made it
clear that at one time all the functions of government were
exercised by what was primarily a council of war, composed of chief, head-men and people. Legislation consisted
merel" in agreeing on certain resolutions which the legislators themselves were forthwith to carry into effect. If a
man was not strong enough to avenge his private injuries
himself, his grievances were heard and redressed by the
whole assembly; but fighting in Court was only slowly developed as a substitute for fighting in the field.' Such a
form of government would obviously meet the needs of only
a very primitive community. Everywhere some one of the
three elements of the council gained power at the expense
of the others, an& the government tended accordingly
toward monarchy, oligarchy, or democracy. In England

I

See, for example, Spencer, Political Institutions, Ch.XIII ; Maine.
Early History of Institutions. Lect. IX and X.
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the monarchic tendency prevailed. The king became not
only the maker and enforcer of the laws, but the fountain
of justice as well. He was himself the judge, and his
"court" was wherever he was. But this concentration of
power became in turn unsuited to the times; despotism became less necessary, and the increasing complexity of interests rendered it impossible for the most benevolent despot
to do what was required. The former tendency was reversed, and from the 'days of King JOHN the struggle of
head-men and, people to recover their lost share in the government has met with increasing success. The head-men
first, and afterward the people, have gained the upper hand,
and have at last made England a democracy.
It'seems now very obvious that the remedy at once for
the despotism and for the overwhelming accumulation of
business was a division of labor. And so it was gradually
worked out. The nobles insisted first that they have a hand
in passing tax laws, and that the king should not inflict'
punishment by his-arbitrary fiat, but by the regular admin-"
istration of law in the courts. These things being conceded, they were able to enforce their demands for an everincreasing share in the legislative power. The people began to demand representation in thW law-making body, and,
once' admitted, they have usurped the whole power. The
veto was the last remnant of the king's legislative power,
and it is gone. The House of Lords steadily lost power,
and, at least since they rejected the Reform Bill and then
"backed down" under the popular displeasure, their share
in legislation has been a 'wholly subordinate one. The
legislative power in England is in the House of Commons.
The'disallowance of the king's Claim to act in person as
judge was followed by a denial of his right to appoint the
judges to hold at his pleasure merely. Then tenure during
good behavior was supplemented by security of income,
and the judiciary was independent except for the king's
power of appointment and of pardon and the Commons'. A'
power of impeachment. Yet when MONTESQUIEU, from hisg"

study of the English government before the evolution had
progressed quite so far, drew the conclusion that legislative,
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executive and judicial powers ought not to be in the same
hands,' it struck even Englishmen as a remarkable and important discovery in the science of government. He, if
not in fact the first to distinctly apprehend this as the essential characteristic of the British Constitution, was emphatically the man who gave it vogue,' and in America his Spirit
of Laws was a very gospel of politics in the last half of the
eighteenth century.
This brief allusion to a very long process will serve at
least to suggest where the maxim concerning the division
of the powers of government came from, and so prepare
the way for finding out what it means. In the first place, it
appears that it has resulted from a slow analysis and differentiation of a congeries of powers once wholly unclassified
and not even recognized as having distinctive characteristics. There is no ground for assuming that the differentiation is complete, or for expecting to find the distinctions so clearly drawn that every function of government
can be assigned to its place in the scheme as unhesitatingly
as a botanist would classify a plant. In the second place,
it is clear that no one has ever proposed to apply the maxim
so rigidly as to secure the absolute separation of the three
departments of government.' A system of "checks and
balances" depends precisely on not placing all legislative,
or all executive, or all judicial power in one department,
and this must be regarded as a practically contemporaneous
modification of the maxim which further detracts from its
definiteness.
When the Declaration of Independence gave the colonies a free rein in determining how they would be governed, most of them promptly framed written constitutions
with this maxim as the very foundation, and the Convention of 1789 followed them in this respect.' The great
merit of these constitution-makers as constructive statesmen consists in the fact that they devised a means of making checks and balances practically effective by making the
2Spirit
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judiciary department strictly co-ordinate with the others
and independent of them.. Nearly all .the State constitu-

- -

tiong have provided in varying terms that the powers of
government shall be vested in-three separate and distinct
departments;' Massachusetts words the provision as follows:
. "In the government of this Commonwealth the legislative department shall never exercise the executive and
judicial powers, or either of them; the executive shall never
exercise the legislative or judicial powers, or either of them;
the judicial shall never exercise the executive or legislative
powers, or either of them; to the end that it may be a government of laws and not of men." 2
This is retained from the Declaration of Rights of 178o ,
and- in its time must have been very striking language.
Another somewhat typical form of the statement is that
ound in the Constitution of Indiana:'
" The powers of the government are divided into three
separate departments: the legislative, the executive, including thi administrative, .and the judiciai; and no person
charged with official duties under one of these departments
shall exercise any of the functions of another, except as in
this Coistitution expressly provided:" The Constitutions
of the United States*and of ile States of New York, Penn-

sylvania, De1aware,'Ohio, Wisconsin, Kansas and North
Dakota havce no formal provision of this sort, but, like all
the rest, their principal articles begin with, "The legislative power shall- be vested," "The executive power shall
be vested," '.Thejudicial power shall be 'vested;" and it
is clear, both-on reasoh and authority, that this enjoins the"
separation of the departments just as imperatively as the
express mandate. It may be taken as settled in American.
constitutional law that all legislative power is vested in the
legislature, and all judicial power in the courts, except as
otherwise expressly provided in the several, constitutions.'
I Vor citations, see i Stimson, American Statute Law, 39.
3
2
Art. III, Sec. I.
Declaration of Rights, Art. XXX.
4 Letters ofJAi, C. J., and others, to President WASuINGTox, printed
in 2 Dall., 410 n.; Marbury v. Madison, i Cranch, p. 67; Kilbourn v.
Thompson, io3 U. S., i68; Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, No. 88,
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Difficulties arise not so much in construing the constitutional exceptions to the principle as in determining
what acts are legislative and what are judicial. Formal
definitions are numerous enough, but not very satisfying
where the question is doubtful.
" A marked difference exists between the employment
of judicial and legislative tribunals. The former decide
upon the legality of claims and conduct, and the latter make
rules upon which, in connection with the Constitution,
those'decisions should be founded. It is the province of
judges to determine what the law is upon existing cases.
In fine, the law is applied by the one and made by the other.
To do the first, therefore, to compare the claims of the
parties with the law of the land before established, is, in its
nature, a judicial act. But to do the last, to pass new rules
for the regulation of new controversies, is, in its nature, a
legislative act."
"The difference between the departments undoubtedly
is that the legislative makes, the executive executes, and
the judiciary construes the law." 2
"The distinction between a judicial and a legislative
act is well defined. The one determines what the law is,
and what the rights of the parties are, with reference to
transactions already had; the other prescribes what the law
'3
shall be in future cases arising under it."
"The legislative power we understand to be theauthority under the Constitution to make laws and to alter
and repeal them. Laws, in the sense in which the word is
here employed, are rules of civil conduct, or statutes which
the legislative will has prescribed. On the other hand, to
adjudicate upon, and protect the rights and interests of individual citizens, and to that end to construe and apply the
laws, is the peculiar province of the judicial department."
I 'Merrillv Sherburne, i N. H., 204.
2 MARSHALL, C. J., in Wayman v. Southard, io Wheat., p. 46.
3 FIELD, J., dissenting, in Sinking Fund Cases, 99 U. S., p. 761.
4 CoOLLY, Constitutional Limitations, No. go. For other definitions of
like tenor, see Ratcliffe v. Anderson, 31 Gratt., p. xo7; Smith v. Strother,
68 Cal., p. x96; Denny v. Mattoon, 2 All., p. 361; Shepard v. Wheeling,
3o W. Va., p. 482.

THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN

It is said, in an early Vermont case, that "no power
can be properly a legislative and properly a judicial power
at the same time; and as to mixed powers, the separation
of the departments in the manner prescribed by the Constitution precludes the possibility of their existence."'
This may be true theoretically, but it seems to imply something more a hiiori and artificial than what we know our
constitutions to be, and it will be found difficult to apply.
The conclusion of a California court that there is a multitudeof minor duties of a nondescript character which are not
strictly legislative, or strictly executive, or strictly judicial,'
is equally true. And dubbing these "administrative" does
not much mend the matter, for it is at once obvious that
this does not make a fourth department, but merely gives
a name to a group of duties taken from the legislative and
executive departments. Since the legislative department
is the broadest in scope, and perhaps corresponds most
nearly to the original depositary of all the powers, it seems
logical to leave to itthe residuum, and say that everything
not clearly executive or clearly judicial is legislative. And'
in general, it is to be borne in mind that the question always is, not what is the etymological meaning of legislative and judicial, but what were in fact the functions of
legislature and courts, respectively, at the time the Constitution in question was framed.'
_ It will be more profitable to ascertain what is the
practical interpretation given to the terms in cases where the
courts have been obliged to determine whether the principle
of the division of powers has been violated. There was at
first a tendency to run to the legislature for a special dispensation in the way of an appeal or a new trial, or a suspension of a troublesome statute, when existing laws seemed to
have left a " hard case" stranded, and it took some time
to make it thoroughly understood that any such dispensation was wholly inconsistent with the co-ordinate position
of the judiciary. Soon after the organization of the Federal
2
People v. Provines, 34 Cal., 520.
v. Kimball, 2 Chip., 77.
Shepard v. Wheeling, 3oW. Va., p. 482; Copp v. Henniker, 55 N. H.,
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Supreme Court, a case came to it from Connecticut in which
a statute granting an appeal out of time was attacked as
unconstitutional.' It was held that the act was not e.,5fost
facto or otherwise repugnant to the Constitution of the
United States, and it was pointed out that while it was an
exercise of judicial, not of legislative authority, Connecticut was still acting under her old charter, and judicial power
was not forbidden to the legislature. The same question
was raised early in Maine and Vermont', and it was decided
that granting an appeal in a special case is an encroachment
on the power of the judiciary, and is forbidden to the legislature. The other departments of the government have
no control over judgments of the courts,' save such as may
be given them by the constitutional provisions concerning
pardons.
And interference with the course of pending cases, before judgment, is equally forbidden. As has been said in a
Massachusetts case:5 "If, for example, the practical operation of a statute is to determine adversary suits pending
between party and party, by substituting in the place of the
well-settled rules of law the arbitrary will of the legislature,
and thereby controlling the action of the tribunal before
which the suits are pending, no one can doubt that it would
be an unauthorized act of legislation, because it directly
infringes on the peculiar and appropriate functions of the
judiciary. It is the exclusive province of the courts ofjustice to apply established principles to cases within their
jurisdiction, and to enforce their decisions by rendering
judgnents and executing them by suitable process. The
legislature has no power to interfere with this jurisdiction
in such manner as to change the decision of cases pending before the courts, or to impair or set aside their judgments, or take cases out of the settled course of judicial
proceeding."
Curative statutes, so-called, frequently give rise to very
1 Calder

v. Bull, 3 Dall., p. 398.

2 Lewis v. Webb, 3 Greenl., 298. 3 Bates v. Kimball, 2 Chip., 77.
4 Story, Constitution, Sec. 1587; Rateliffe z Anderson, 31 Gratt., io5 .
5 Denny v. N1 Ittooa, 2 All., 31.
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nice questions which it would carry us too far to consider
here, but all the cases agree in this, that jurisdictional defects in judicialproceedings cannot be cured by subsequent
legislation so as to render valid a judjment which would
otherwise be void-; for in such case the validity must come
from the statute itself, and the legislature cannot render
judgments.' Expository statutes are effective from date,
being practically new enactments, but they cannot reverse
decisions already made;2 nor can they control the interpretation of the courts in dealing with causes of action already
accrued.' Pennsylvania courts were at first rather complaisant toward legislative encroachments of this sort; but ix
Greenough v. Greenough,' Chief-Justice GIBSON, after ad-

verting to the fact that their former supineness in this regard had tended to destroy the balance between the departments in that State, emphatically declined to allow any
retrospective force to a legislative interpretation of their
Wills Act, purporting to apply to the wills of persons already
deceased.
A particularly good illustration of the difference
between legislative and judicial power is afforded by the
somewhat common attempt to enlist the aid of the courts
in organizing municipal corporaions and changing their
boundaries, the purpose obviously being to secure an
impartial arbiter between the corporation and the propertyowners concerned. Section 431 of the Iowa Code, for
example, provides in substance that when a city desires to
annex contiguous, platted territory, it may file a petition
describing the land, naming the owners and attaching a
plat; that the city shall be deemed the plaintiff and these
owners defendants, and the further proceedings shall be
as in other cases, as near as may be. If the Court finds
that the territory is subdivided and contiguous, and that
justice and equity require the admission of all or any of it,
I

axwell v. Goetschius, 40 N. J. L., 383 ; Houseman v. Kent, 58 Mich.,

364.
2

CooLIW, Constitutional Limitations, No. 94.

3 Ogden v. Blackledge,
4 11 Pa. St., 489.

2

Cranch, i94; Holden v. James, ii Mass., 396.
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a decree shall be granted accordingly, and it is annexed.
In the case of the City of Burlington z. Leebrick,' the
constitutionality of the act was drawn in question, but the
Court held that there were definite issues presented and
that the determination of them was so far judicial in character that it might be referred to the courts. Nebraska
has a similar statute, following a little more closely the
usual forms of litigation by providing for personal service
on defendants by the sheriff, instead of notice by publication as in Iowa, and the decision in City of Burlingtoii v.
Leebrick has been followed
Kansas has a statute 3 providing, less formally, that a
city of the second class, desiring to annex unplatted, adjacent territory, may present a "petition" to the judge of
the district court, describing the territory "and asking
said judge to make a finding as to the advisability of adding said territory to said city."
"Upon said petition
being presented to said judge, with proof that notice of
the time and place said petition shall be so presented has
been published for three consecutive weeks in some newspaper published in said'city, he shall proceed to hear testimony as to the advisability of making such addition; and
upon such hearing, if he shall be satisfied that the adding of
such terrftory will be to its interest, and will cause no manifest injury to the persons owning real estate in the territory sought to be so added, lie shall so find; and thereupon
the city council of said city may add such territory to said
city by an ordinance providing for the same."
This was
attacked as conferring legislative power on the judiciary,
but the court balanced off the authorities on the point and
said, as it had been held both ways, the action could not
be so clearly unjudicial as to warrant them in overthrowing
the statute.
Kansas also has a statute,' providing that when a city
143 Ia., 252 (1876).

" City of Wahoo v. Dickinson, 23 Neb., 426 (SSS).
3 Compiled Laws, IS89, Sec. 884.
4 Callen v. City of Junction City, 42 Kan., 627 (iS9o).
5 Compiled Laws, 1889, Section 552.
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of the first class desires to enlarge its limits it shall
describe the proposed new boundary by ordinance, and,
within twenty days, publish it in the official city paper;
and the mayor, at the next term of the district court, shall
present to said court a copy of the ordinance with proof of
"Thereupon said court shall determine
publication.
whether said publication has been made as herein required,
and shall then consider said ordinance, and by its judgment
eiiher approve, disapprove or modify the same, first hearing all objections, if any, and proofs, if any, offered by
said city or persons affected by said ordinance. Should
said ordinance be approved or modified by said court, then
the limits or area of said city shall be enlarged or extended;
as therein designated, from the date of such approval or
modification. But, should it be disapproved entirely, then
the linits or area of the city shall remain unaffected by

such proceedings; but should the same be approved entirely, or modified and approved, the judgment of said

court shall stand, and the limits of such city shall be extended, as is in said judgment specified, and the determination of the matter thus submitted to said court shall be
final, and all the courts of the State shall take judicial

notice of the limits or area of such city, as thus enlarged
and extended, and of all the. steps in the proceedings leading thereto." This was also challenged as unconstitutional
on the same ground, but it was held that the power therein
conferred on the district court is "judicial," within the
decision in the preceding case, and that the statute is valid.'
The point was again raised, and again decided the same
way and on the same ground, the last decision not even
Nor in any of these cases was any
being referred to.'
notice taken of an early Kansas decision, in which the
Court went a little out of its way to hold that similar
authority, then conferred on the probate court, was judicial.3 The precise question as to whether such functions,
if delegated by the Legislature, could be delegated to
1 Huling v. City of Topeka, 44 Kansas, 577 (18go).
2

Hurla v. City of Kansas City, 27 Pac. Rep. (189I).

8 Kirkpatrick v. State, 5 Kansas, 673 (1868).

LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL POWER.

courts, was not very distinctly raised and no authority was
cited on the point. The first Kansas case did cite, in addition to the *Iowaand Nebraska decisions, as supporting the
conclusion there reached, Blanchard v. Bissell,' Kayser v.
Trustees of Bremen, 2 and Borough of Little Meadows3 . Of
these the first is not in point at all, because there the council
petitions the county commissioners, whose functions are
primarily political. The others are briefly and unsatisfactorily reported, but it appears from the Missouri case that a
petition was presented to the Court, and if it found certain
facts to be as therein set forth, the town was to be declared
incorporated, regardless of the Court's personal opinion as
to the expediency of it. This proceeding is said to be
judicial. From the Pennsylvania case it appears that it
was the practice to refer the petition for incorporation to
the Grand Jury, who reported to the Court of Sessions as
to the truth of the facts alleged therein, and the Court
confirmed the report if favorable. In that particular case
it was held simply that the corporation laws did not
authorize the Court to include several farms with a straggling hamlet and call it a village, and the question as to
whether courts could rightfully exercise such functions in
any case was not at all considered. Moreover, the "Court
of Sessions" in that State seems to designate "the tribunal transacting county business," and to be, like the
Board of -County Commissioners of other States, rather an
administrative than a judicial body.
These three cases, therefore, seem not to afford a very
secure foundation for a decision that needs authority to rest
on, and it seems safe to assume that the Iowa, Nebraska
and Kansas decisions will be generally regarded as out of
harmony with the principles heretofore laid down as settled.
The real nature of the proceedings is, perhaps, more apparent in the Kansas cases, because they masquerade less in
the guise of an ordinary lawsuit. What really determines
the action of the Court in all the cases is the judge's personal opinion as to the exfiediency of including certair
territory, for the future, in a particular political subdivision.
I 11

0. St., 96.

2

6 Mdo., 88.

'335 Pa- St., .335.
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The findings as to platting, and contiguity, and notice, are
a mere preliminary. If the conditions under which annexation is allowable are not present, the Court cannot act at
all; but if the necessary conditions are shown to exist, they
do not at all control the action of the Court. This phase
of the matter receives comparatively little notice in the
opinions, while the preliminary findings are emphasized as
if the courts were sure that so much, at least, is judicial.
It is said in the Iowa case "that it is not the sole province
of courts to determine what the existing law is in relation
to some existing thing already done or happened. It is a
much a judicial act to determine what are the facts of a
particular case, and whether they bring the case within the
operation of a recognized principle of the existing law."
True enough ; but that is not the same thing as saying that
it is a judicial act to determine what are the facts of a particular case, and whether they make it advisable to enact a
new law. Determining facts is judicial only.as it is a necessary incident to rendering judgment according to an existing
law. There is nothing judicial about determining, as an
abstract question, when Columbus discovered America, or
in determining it for the purpose of enabling Congress to
decide when the World's Fair, iii commemoration of the
event, ought to begin. One required to ascertain the facts
of a particular case without the power to render a judgment
therein reviewable only according to established law, is a
commissioner, not a judge, however closely he may follow
judicial forms.'
And it is an abuse of terms to call the question whether
justice and equity require the annexation of certain territory a judicial one because it calls for judgment and discretion. All legislative and most executive acts require
the same. 2 Besides, it is only the political department of
the government that has the privilege of considering the
abstract justice and equity of its acts. "Justice and equity,"
for the courts, mean merely conformity to law, and one
might easily.fil to realize how radical a departure from
I United States v. Ferreira, 13 How., 4b; r Kent, 297 n.
2

Auditor v. A. T. & S. F. R. R. Co., 6 Kan., 5oo.
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Anglo-Saxon methods it is to leave the determination of
them in any other sense to the judges. It is throwing away
the fruits of a victory which it took a thousand years to
win, and abandoning the attempt to secure a government
of laws and not of men.
The determination of how the State shall be subdivided
for the purposes of local government is pre-eminently legislative. The warrant for delegating it to political officers,
like county commissioners and city councils, is in many constitutions slender enough. It is frequently implied, rather
than expressly stated, local self-government being apparently so fundamental an assumption that it did not occur
to anyone as being necessary to insert in the Constitution a
formal declaration that it is to be retained.' But there is
no ground for implying any kind of local management
except such as was then customary, and certainly a legislature must find express warrant to justify it in requiring the
fitfciary to pass on the expediency of incorporatifig territory. Clearly a mere veto power is legislative in character,
but the courts in the cases in hand have much more than
this. The matter rather comes before them in'the hape of
a -committee report, which they may adopt, reject, or amend
to suit-themselves.
In the Nebraska case, and in the first of the three recent
Kansas decisions, the courts make much-of the-fact that the
effect of the proceeding is to anticipate litigation and avoid a
multiplicity of suits. It is said in the latter, for example
"1To avoid separate suits of this character by individual
landowners, and before property interests are affected and
perplexing complications arise, this section provides for a
determination of the rights of all the parties in one action.
"The practical effect of this statute is to submit to the
district judge, in advance of its enactment, the question of
the legality of the city ordinance." '2
The novelty of this very desirable consummation might
well have aroused some misgivings asto its regularity. To
allow the judiciary a decision on the validity of a law before
COOLEY, Constitutional Limitations, No. :91.
" Callen z,.
City of Junction, 43 Kan., p. 633.
'
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it has involved a wrong to any would give th6 judiciary an
absolute veto upon the legislature,1 and the people no more
want the judiciary than the legislature supreme. In fact
the supremacy of the judiciary would be much the worse
evil; for the people might in a few months undo the results
of legislative mistake or perversity, while the decrees of a
judicial oligarchy might be remediless.' Moreover, neither
the legislature nor individuals are at liberty to take up the
time of the courts with mere legal conundrums, and judicial deliverances on matters not in litigation settle them,
if at all, not by furnishing a proper precedent, but by com•mitting the judge.'
The findings, then, as to justice and equity, as the
terms are used in these statutes, could not be "judicial"
under any circumstances, and the findings as to platting,
contiguity and notice are not judicial in these .cases, because
they are not made with a view to determining "whether
they bring the case within the operation of a recognized
principle of the existing law."
If these conclusions are sound in theory, they are also
abundantly *supported by authority. A similar statute
came before the Supreme Court of Illinois in the case of
City of Galesburg v. Hawkinson,4 and that Court said:
" Whether cities, towns or villages should be incorporated,
whether enlarged or contracted in their.boundaries, presents
no question of law or fact for judicial determination. It
is purely a question of policy to be determined by the legislative department." It was further pointed out that while
courts may determine what are the corporate limits already
est#blished, whether they are as claimed, whether authority
has been exceeded, etc., all this implies an existing law;
but here the question presented is, what shall the law be
as to boundaries, and the decree is the answer. A legislature may not set aside a judgment, but no one would deny
that it might the next moment change city boundaries as
fixed by such a decree.
I YuLroRD,
2

The Nation, 205.
WOODBURY, J., dissenting, in Luther v. Borden, 7 How., p. 52.

8 CooLzy, Principles of Constitutional Law, i39.
4 75 1., 152 (1874).
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A Minnesota law of the same sort authorized the Court
to declare incorporated so much of the described territory
as justice might require, if it was satisfied that the
interests of the inhabitants would be promoted. The Supreme Court say it is too clear for argument that the determination of such questions involves the exercise of purely
and exclusively legislative power.' The Supreme Court of
Michigan, speaking of the same matter with reference to a
somewhat different statute, say : " Such a determination,
wherever made, belongs to policy rather than law, and is
political and not judicial. Any confusion which has been
discovered in the authorities has arisen from the use of the
term "judicial" in more than one sense, and in applying
it sometimes to all acts involving discretion and judgment,
instead of confining it to the "judicial power" which belongs to courts of justice, and relates to controversies on
questions of public or private right." 2 It has been held in
California that the propriety of including land in a municipality is, in general, a politic~l question for the legislative
department;3 and in New York, that the action of supervisors in incorporating towns is legislative.'
A California decision, to the effect that the governor,
surveyor-general, and State engineer could not be made
commissioners to divide the State into drainage districts
and organize them as such, because this was a legislative
function and, if delegable at all, not delegable to executive
officers,' would seem to be entirely analogous in principle
to these corporate limit cases.
The Legislature of West Virginia went beyond all the
statutes so far referred to by providing, generally, that on
petition of ten resident taxpayers a Circuit Court might
"supersede, revoke and annul . . . any ordinance of a
This was
city, town or village, made contrary to law."'
held bad, as being an obvious grant of legislative power to
I State v. Simons, 32 Minn., 540 (1884).
Shumway v. Bennett, 29 Mich., 451 (I874).
3 People v. City of Riverside, 70 Cal., 461 (iSS6.)
4 People v. Carpenter, 24 N. Y., S6 (1861).
5 People v. Parks, 58 Cal., 624 (188i).
6 Shepard v. Wheeling, 30 W. Va, 479 (1887).
2
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the Courts. Annulling ordinances made contrary to law
superficially bears more resemblance to judicial action than
passing ordinances in the first instance, but they are alike
legislative acts. To apply.the doctrine of this case 'to the
annexation of territory: if it would be legislative, on the
petition of ten taxpayers having no special grievance to
annul an annexation ordinance made contrary to law, a
fortioriis it legislative, on petition of a city not claiming
-any infraction of its rights under existing laws, to enact
what, if passed in the same terms by a legislative body,
would be an annexation ordinance.
This case also calls attention to a common misapprehension as to the effect of a judicial decision as to the cod'stitutionality of a law. Courts are frequently said to declare
laws unconstitutional andvoid, and their language, it must
be admitted, frequently takes that form. But, as is here
pointed out, what they really do is to ignore a statute that is
considered unconstitutional, and decide the case in hand as
if the statute did not exist. The Act is not stricken from
the statute book, and it is not superseded, revoked, or annulled. If the courts afterward change their minds, as did
the Supreme Court of the United States in the legal tender
cases, the statute is just as effective as if it had never been
pronounced unconstitutional. As was said in an Ohio case:
The general and abstract question, whether an act of the
legislature be unconstitutional, cannot with propriety be
presented to a court; the question must be whether the
act furnishes the rule to govern the particular case."' For
this reason it is eminently appropriate that the legislature,
if it acquiesces in the decision, should repeal such acts, as
was in fact sometimes done when for the courts to hold laws
unconstitutional was a new thing.
It has been held in Tennessee that the creation of corporations is a legislative matter which could not be delegated to the courts even if the Constitution were silent in
regard to it. 3 As, however, their Constitution authorizes
IFoster v. Commissioners, 9 0. St., 543 ; Relation of the Judiciary
to the Constitution, 19 American Law Review, 175.
2 i9 American Law Review, p. 188.
3 State v. Armstrong, 3 Sneed, 634.
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the legislature to grant to the inferior courts such powers
with regard to private and local affairs as may be deemed
expedient, they may be empowered to "mganize" corporations ; but they then act ministerially, not judicially, and
no appeal lies from a refusal to organize.' These rulings
are with immediate reference to business corporations, but
the reasoning would seem to apply with even greater force
to municipal corporations.
It would seem, therefore, that the considerations of
xeason and policy in favor of placing the regulation of
municipal boundaries in the hands of the judiciary, ought
to be more weighty than we have found, in order to justify
a court in passing by these authorities to follow the Iowa,
Nebraska and Kansas decisions.
Moreover, the statutes
there passed upon are not so nearly alike as they appear to
have been considered. In Iowa there is no provision for
the enactment of an ordinance by the council at any stage
of the proceedings; under the Kansas statute last mentioned, an ordinance is the first thing, but from an examination of the statute as a whole, it is clear that the "judgment" of the court, not tl
ordinance, is ultimately to
determine the status of the territory concerned.
In
Nebraska, on the other hand, and in Kansas under the
second-class city act, the annexation is consummated by an
ordinance to be passed after it has received judicial aproval.
It is not impossible that these ordinances might be held
effective to annex the territory, even if the action of the
Court in the matter were held to be unauthorized and
wholly nugatory. No notice is taken of the distinction in
any of the cases, and the opinions show that it was the
intention to go the whole length in sustaining the action of
the courts as judicial. An appeal is provided for in both
instances. But in the Kansas statute it is from the judge
of the District Court to the District Court, and as in that
State the District Court consists of one judge, this seems to
give a right rather less valuable than an "appeal from
Philip drunk to Philip sober;" for in this instance Philip is
presumably sober on both occasions, and there is no pro' Expare Burns, i Tenn., Ch.83 ; expiarle Chadwell, id., 95.
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vision as to what would be the reward of a successful appeal
if, in the meantime, the council had passed its ordinance.
In fact an appeal is an absurdity where the question is as to
the opinion of an individual as to the advisability of annexing territory. In the nature of things it can not be tried.
This suggests the query whether leaving to the arbitrary
will of a judge interests of citizens so important as the subjection of their property to the burdens of city government
would be "due process of law 1 and the "equal protection
of the laws" which everyone may claim, even if leaving
the matter to a judge were otherwise objectionable.'
The Iowa case was decided with only the inconclusive
Pennsylvania decision previously referred to before it; the
Nebraskajudges ignored the Michigan case of Shumway v.
Bennett because the statutes were different, and deliberately
followed City of Burlington v. Leebrick in preference to
City of Galesburg v. Hawkinson. Probably there was no
oral argument in any of the Kansas cases, and none of
them purport to go very fully into the matter as an original
question.
There are numerous decisions of a miscellaneous character, which further illustrate the relation between legislatures and courts; but in considerifig these it is to be noted
that in many constitutions there is express provision for
certain mixed tribunals, in some of which the judicial, and
in others the* administrative element is the more prom.
inent. Thus, some of the lower courts may be authorized
to exercise some non-judicial functions; or the board of
county commissioners, or supervisors, or whatever the corresponding officers may be called, may be vested with some
judicial powers. It is only decisions that do not seem to
turn on any peculiar provision of this sort that will be valuable on the general question.
A statute authorizing the parties to agree upon a member of the bar of the Supreme Court to try ' a case in which
the judge is interested, is void. The' attorney selected
would not be a judge, and the legislature cannot vest judi1See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 1i8 U. S., 356; Shumway v. Bennett,
Mich., 45r.
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cial power in any one else.' "It is as incompetent for the
legislature to confer the power to tax upon the judiciary as
upon the executive." '
The legislature cannot require the
Supreme Court to give its opinions in writing, because
writing out the reasons for their decisions is not judicial,3
or require it to prepare the syllabi for the reports,' or require courts to appoint surveyors.5 It seems that it may
provide for commissioners to "assist" the Supreme Court,
taking care not to authorize them to decide anything. 6 On
the other hand, legislative divorces seem to be bad on principle. Decisions the other way generally proceed on an
established usage which it is scarcely practicable to overthrow.7
There is a dictum in a recent Pennsylvania case
to the
effect that admitting attorneys to practice is a judicial
matter, and that the Legislature may not order admission
on compliance with certain requirements.' A recent New
York law provides that the Supreme Court or county judge
may, on the application of the local authorities, order a
flagman or a gate to be maintained at railroad crossings,
first giving notice to the company; and the Supreme Court
has held, one judge dissenting, that this is a mere provision
for determining the necessity, and not a delegation of
legislative power.' One is inclined to say that the former
case is probably, and the latter certainly, wrong, unless
they have some special constitutional warrant not referred
to in the opinions.
It was said in a Kansas case that the action of the
Board of County Commissioners, in rejecting a claim against
the county, is so far judicial that an appeal may be taken,
I Van Slyke v. Insurance Co., 39 Wis., 39 o .
2 Munday v. Rahway, 43 N.J. L., P. 348, quoting CooLEY, Taxation, 34.
3 Houston v. Williams, 13 Cal., 24. In a very emphatic opinion by
Justice FIELD.

' Ex arie Griffiths, Ind., 83.
5Houseman v. Kent, 58 Mich., 364.

6 People v. Hayne, 83 Cal., III; Railroad Co. v. Abilene Town Site
Co.,42 Kan., lO4. State v. Noble,. I18 Ind., 350, is contra.
7 CooLny, Constitutional Limitations, No. 113.
6 Petition of Splane, 123 Pa. St., 527.
9 People v. Railroad Co., 12 N. Y. Sup., 4r.
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but not so far judicial as to make' the matter res judicala
if the appeal is not taken.' It has sinoe been held that the
action is not judicial, but the appeal is still allowed.' Since
the statute giving the "appeal'" provides for notice to the
county, possibly it may be said that appeal is not used in
the technical sense, and this is merely a special "way. of
getting into court." I is clear that, appeals, in the proper
sense of the term, lie only from the action of a tribunal
clothed with judicial authority, and acting in a judicial
capacity.' A statute also provides for an appeal from the
commissioners' award of road damages, to be takenz ".upon
the same terms, in the same manner, and with like effect
as in appeals from judgments of justices of the peace in
civil cases." ' The language h ere excludes any fiction
about a special way of getting into court, and if the appellee was not already in court, there is no provision for
service at all. The judiciary article of the Constitution
authorizes the legislature to create courts inferior to the
Supreme Court,6 and the legislative article provides that
"the legislature may confer upon tribunals transacting the
county business of the several counties such powers of local
legislation and administration as it shall deem expedient." 7 But both the language -and the position of this
clause seem to forbid reading into it authority to confer
judicial power on the tribunal transacting the county business, and it would seem that an express permission of this
sort is indispensable to justify making a political body also
a court under the other section. Calling the action of county
commissioners in such cases "quasi-judicial" 8 is not meeting the point, and as an original qflestion, it would seem that
there is no authority for vesting judicial power in the commissioners in any case, and that therefore their decisions are
not appealable.
I Commissioners v. Keller, 6 Kan., 307.
2 Gillett v. Commissioners, 18 Kan., 410.
8 Compiled Laws, -1889, Sec. 1649.
4Story, Constituton, 1761.
5Compiled Laws, 1889, Sec. 5480.
6 Art III, Sec. 1.
7 Art.,ll, See. 2r.
8 County of Leavenworth v. Brewer, 9 Kan., p. 319; B'ulkerson v.
Commissioners, 31 Kan., 126.
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There remains the question whether non-judicial
functions, which may not be imposed on the courts as such,
may yet be imposed on the judges as individuals. The
question, of course, does not arise where, as is frequently
the case, the Constitution provides expressly that persons
exercising functions properly pertaining to one department
shall not exercise those pertaining to any other. And it is
difficult to discover any justification for such a subterfuge
where this is not done. It does not at all avoid the reasons
of policy which dictate the separation of the duty of inaking laws from that of expounding *them. To litigate the
constitutionality of a law before the legislature which
passed it, or before a judge who had given it his approval
before its enactment, would be unsatisfactory, not because
of anything that pertains to the officers as such, but because of what pertains to them as men. Yet when, in 1793,
the United States Circuit Courts were directed to examine
into pension claims and report to the departments, while
all agreed that the duties required were not judicial, and
therefore could not be performed by them as courts, yet
there was some difference of opinion at first as to whether
the judges might not, outside their judicial duties, perform the services as commissioners. The first case under
the Act went off on the ground that this was an unwarrantable construction of the statute,' but a little conference
between the judges led them to the conclusion that the
Constitution would not warrant it, if the statute did.
Long afterward the appointment of supervisors of congressional elections by the circuit judges, on a petition
from voters, was opposed by certain citizens of Cincinnati
as unconstitutional on this ground, but the duty was held
to be judicial.' The judge added that if the Act directed
him to act personally as supervisor, he would decline to
obey it. It wAs also pointed out that the Constitution of
the United States authorizes Congress to vest the appointment of subordinate officers in the courts of justice,' and
the statute was construed as giving the power to the Court.
1 Havburn's Case, 2 Dall., 409, 41o n.

!'ht te Citizens of Cincinnati, 2 Flip., 228.

'

Art. II, Sec. 2.
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The action seems not to be judicial except in the sense that
it is thus authorized to be performed by a court; and under
a similar State law it was held in Massachusetts that the
court could not act because the appointment was not judicial, and the judges could not act because the Constitution
expressly forbids them to hold such an office.' But these
decisions do not go very far toward determining whether
they might make such appointments under a Constitution
which does not forbid them to perform other than judicial
duties except by assigning the powers of government to
a legislature, an executive and a judiciary.
It has been said in California that a police judge may
be made ex officio police commissioner, because the three
departments which the Constitution requires shall be kept
separate are the departments of the State government, and
the legislature may mix powers in the local government,
which it is to establish, as much as it pleases. 2 This is
certainly untying the knot by cutting it. The whole history of the doctrine, and the whole practical application of
it elsewhere, forbids such an interpretation. There seems
to be nothing peculiar in the Constitution of California to
justify it, and it does not reassure one as to the correctness
of the decision to find that it calls the appointment of
policemen a judicial act, or if not strictly so, not so clearly
executive or legislative as to be forbidden to the judiciary
department.
It has been held allowable from early days in Kansas
to impose other than judicial duties on the Probate Judge.
In passing upon a portion of the liquor law of that State,
which provides for the issue of C, druggists' permits" by
the Probate Judge, the correctness of these decisions was
questioned, but it was thought then the less evil to follow
them.3 It is said that the effect of the statute is to create
the office of commissioner of licenses, and provide that it
shall be filled by the person occupying the position of Probate Judge. It is also suggested that the earlier decisions
Case of Supervisors, 114 Mass., 247.
People v. Provines, 34 Cal., 520.
8 Intoxicating Liquor Cases, 25 Kan., 751.
1
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are somewhat countenanced by the fact that the jiudges of
the Supreme and District Courts, but not the judges of the
Probate Courts, are expressly forbidden by the Constitution
to hold other offices of trust or profit. If, however, this
would be forbidden without an express prohibition, the
omission of a prohibition cannot amount to a grant. In
an earlier case there is an enumeration of the somewhat
curious jumble of duties at that time given to the Probate
Court or Probate Judge, with a caveat as to the constitutionality of such as had not been adjudicated, and a di&um to
the effect that the non-judicial functions could not be forced
on the judge against his will.' Toallow himi to act or not,
as he chose, would not be -very satisfactory as a practical
matter, and it would.be anomalous for any one in the State
to be at liberty to disregard a law unless it is void.
But there is a class of cases much more satisfactory
than any of these, which negatives completely the right of
a legislature -to impose extra-judicial duties on the incumbents of judicial offices, without express constitutional warrant. These are the decisions in regard to the right of the
other departments of government to call for the opinions
of' the justices of the Supreme Court on questions of law.
The practice, so far as it prevails here, is obviously modelled
on that of the English House of Lords, in accordance with
which the judges are called upon to give the House their
opinion on feigned cases, and nothing is clearer than that
these opinions are not binding, and therefore not judicial.
About the time the Federal judges had under consideration
the question as to-their duty under the Pension Act before
referred to, President WASHIN TON made a formal request
for the opinion of the justices of the Supreme Court on
various questions of international and maritime law, and
they finally declined to give them, 2 taking the ground that
under .the Constitution "neither the legislative nor executive branches can constitutionally assign to the judicial
any duties but such as are properly judicial, and to be perI In

reJohnson, 12 Kan., p. 104.

" For an account of this correspondence, see 4 American Jurist, 293.
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formed in a judicial manner."1 The case of the United
States v. Todd 2 is a decision going practically to this length,
and it, with the refusal of the justices, has been accepted as
settling the matter under the Federal Constitution. That
under such circumstances the judges act merely as advisers
to the other departments is the natural inference from the
origin of the practice, and such has generally been the conclusion of the State as well as the Federal judges.' Some
half dozen States have provisions in their constituiions
authorizing the other departments to call on the judiciary
for such opinions. New York, Vermont and Minnesota
have statutes iurporting to give like authority, but Minnesota has held hers unconstitutional,' and one would expect
the same decision. with regard to the others if they were
contested.
The conclusion seems to be that the definitions which
seemed so meagre and insufficient are both accurate and
complete. The Federal Constitution describes the judicial
power of which it speaks, as extending to all cases in law
and equity.5 Now, "a case is a controversy between parties which has taken shape for judicial decision," ' and it
is the whole of "judicial power," as the words are used
in the constitutions, to hear and determine litigated cases,
,except as other matters may be strictly incidental to that.
A hundred years of exposition has merely confirmed HAMILTON'S original view of the matter.

He says:7

"The executive not 'only dispenses the honors, but
holds the sword of the community. The legislature not
only commands the purse, but prescribes the rules by
which the duties and rights of every citizen are to be reg1

Letter of JAY, C. J., and others, to President WASmNGT'ON, concern-

ing the pension matter, 2 Dali., 410 n.
2 13 How., 52 n.
3 Reply of the Judges, 33 Conn., 586; a paper on the Duty of Judges
as Constitutional Advisers, 24 American Law Review, 369, collects the decisions, also collating in a note the questions submitted in the various
States.
4 Application of the Senate, io Minn., 78.
5 Art III, Sec. 2.
6 JOHN MARSHALL, in a speech in Congress, reported in 5 Wheat
App., 16; also in Osborn v. U. S. Bank, 9 Wheat, p. 819.
7 Federalist, No. 78.
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ulatea. The judiciary, on the contrary, has no influence
over either the sword or the purse ; no direction either of
the strength or of the wealth of the society, and can take
no active resolution whatever. It may be truly said to
have neither force nor will, but merely judgment, and
must ultimately depend upon aid of the executive arm for
the efficacious exercise even of this faculty.
"This simple view of the matter suggests several important corqsequences: it proves incontestably that the
judiciary is, beyond comparison, the weakest of the three
departments of power; that it can never attack with success
either of the other two; And that all possible care is
requisite to enable it to defend itself against their attacks."
With a full appreciation of the fact that enabling the
judiciary to defend itself agaihst the attacks of the other
departments was the crowning feature of the Constitution
he was commending, he called the courts of justice the
bulwarks of a limited Constitution against legislative encroachments,' and pointed out the subordinate condition
of the judiciary department as the defect which elsewhere
has left constitutional limitations to the mercy of the legislature. That system which best preserves the inde.pendence of each department approaches nearest to the
perfection of civil government and the security of civil
liberty.' The courts are. commissioned by the people to
maintain this independence as completely as the nature
of society and the imperfections of human institutions
will permit, and to this end they must, with firmness, bht
with all due courtesy and forbearance, resist all legislative
intrusion into their field, and with equal firmness and
courtesy must they decline to exercise forbidden power
when it is offered them. Encroachments from either side
alike obscure the line, and no encroachment is so easy to
oppose as the first.
Topeka, Kansas.
I Federalist,

NO. 78..,
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Ratcliffe z'. Anderson, 31 Gratt., io5.

